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For Fiji, 1991 was a year of continuing
political turbulence and economic
uncertainty. The country weathered
several actual and threatened industrial
strikes, and witnessed the emergence of
a number of political parties in antici-
pation of the general elections sched-
uled for May 1992. The economy faced
the full onslaught of the interim
regime's deregulation measures, which
brought it into confrontation with
trade unions and other opposition par-
ties. The year will be remembered as
pregnant with many ominous possibili-
ties, and some of them will be manifest
m 1992.
On the political front, several
important developments took place.
The political party backed by the Great
Council of Chiefs, the Soqosoqo ni
Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT), whose
formation was approved by the council
in June 1990, formalized its constitu-
tion and began the highly divisive pro-
cess of selecting candidates to contest
the 37 Fijian communal seats. The SVT,
says its constitution, will promote the
interests of the taukei, the indigenous
Fijians, "in association with other eth-
nic communities in Fiji," seek to rees-
tablish Fiji's links to the British Crown
and with the Commonwealth, and pur-
sue economic policies that promote
economic growth and development
within an essentially deregulated envi-
ronment to allow "world market forces
to determine prices and production for
export and local markets through an
efficient and productive private sector
enterprise" (SVT constitution, 10). In
November 1991, Sitiveni Rabuka was
elected to the presidency of the party,
winning 9 of the 19 votes cast to Adi
Lady Lala Mara's 6 and Ratu William
Toganivalu's 4.
The election of a commoner
(although an uncommon one) over two
high-ranking chiefs to head a chiefs'
party provoked much comment. Some
Fijian observers raised fundamental
questions about the inevitably corro-
sive impact on the fijian chiefly system
of chiefs participating in the hurly-
burly of electoral politics as traditional
representatives of their people. Others
saw the formation of the SVT as essen-
tially an attempt by the eastern-domi-
nated chiefly establishment to control
the political destiny of the taukei, and
to maintain the status quo.
One of these was the ever-mercurial
Apisai Tora, who at various times in
his checkered political career has
belonged to the Indo-fijian-backed
National Federation Party, the Alli-
ance, and in 1987 the violence-threat-
ening, stridently anti-Coalition Taukei
Movement. "Our firm view," he said
"remains that the Bose Levu Vaka-
turaga [Great Council of Chiefs]
should be at the pinnacle of Fijian soci-
ety, totally removed from the taint of
ordinary politicking" (FT, 10 Oct 1991).
In July, he launched his own party, the
All National Congress (ANC), a move
that brought the wrath of the interim
regime and cost him his cabinet posi-
tion in the interim government. With
its base in western Fiji, a place with a
long history of political dissent against
both the colonial state and the postco-
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lonial Alliance government, the ANC
presented itself as a multiracial party
for all the people of Fiji. To no one's
surprise, Tora presented himself as a
changed person, "a moderate and a
democrat," saying that Fiji had to find
a home for all its people on the basis of
justice and fairness: "The people of
Fiji, whether we are Fijians, Indians or
Europeans, or whatever, are here and
here to stay. There is no place else for
us to go" (FT, 7 Aug 1991). In 1987 Tora
was among those calling for the emas-
culation of Indo-Fijians' political
rights. He hopes to win a number of
seats in western Viti Levu as well as a
few ANc-aligned General Voter seats to
hold the balance of power in the next
parliament.
Several other Fijian splinter parties,
such as the Fijian Conservative Party
and Sakiasi Butadroka's Fijian Chris-
tian Nationalist Party (formerly the
Fijian Nationalist Party), hope for a
similar outcome. Butadroka's party has
changed its name but not its platform.
It still demands the political oblitera-
tion of the Indo-Fijians and complete
Fijian control of the economy, includ-
ing the return of all fee simple and
other lands to indigenous hands. In
November, Fijians in western Viti Levu
launched their own Fijian Landowners
Party, with a pro-western Fijian plat-
form similar to the policies of the West-
ern United Front of the 1980s (Lal,
1983). The emergence of splinter Fijian
parties is not altogether surprising,
though their impact on the Fijian polit-
ical scene is not likely to be significant.
A diminishing fear of the threat of
Indo-Fijian political dominance, a
quiet but strong suspicion of the hege-
monic ambition of eastern Fijians, and
personal political aspirations, mean
that political fragmentation will be a
continuing feature of taukei political
life.
On the Indo-Fijian side, too, there is
evidence of political fragmentation. In
1991 a number of parties emerged,
essentially fragments of bodies for-
merly associated with the now-defunct
Alliance party. Among them were the
Fiji Indian Congress and the Indian
Liberal Party. However, these parties
are not likely to have any major elec-
toral impact; some may even vanish
before election day 1992. Although
dormant since the coups of 1987, the
National Federation Party (NFP)
remains the dominant, representative
voice of the Indo-Fijian community.
The combination of a racially discrimi-
natory constitution that gives Indo-
Fijians (nearly half the total popula-
tion) only 27 of the 71 seats, various
pro-Fijian policies of the interim
regime, and a general sense of helpless-
ness has given the party (and its con-
stituency) a sense of cohesiveness that
it has rarely enjoyed in the past.
In September 1991, the NFP decided
to participate in the forthcoming elec-
tions under protest. The decision was
taken to prevent the Indo-Fijian seats
from being occupied by "irresponsible
people," in Jai Ram Reddy's words (FT,
21 Sept 1991). There was also the reali-
zation that, whatever the NFP'S atti-
tudes, many Indo-Fijians would con-
test the seats for reasons of their own,
including settling old scores. Boycot-
ting the elections, the party leaders
apprehended, would be disastrous for
their community's broader interests
and severely detrimental to the party's
future survival.
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Although the decision to participate
may have pleased many disenchanted
Indo-Fijians, it deeply dismayed the
NFP'S coalition partner, the Fiji Labour
Party (FLP), which had resolved earlier
to boycott the elections. How could the
party contest elections under a consti-
tution it had proclaimed to the world
to be racist, feudalistic, authoritarian,
and unjust? Participation in the elec-
tions, argued the FLP leaders, would
give legitimacy to the constitution and
amount to its acceptance. But princi-
pled resolve eventually gave way to
practical realities. Fearing political
marginalization and urged by their
supporters, the FLP'S indigenous Fijian
strategists effectively jettisoned their
previous position and began to explore
ways of forging a common ground
with other independents and like-
minded parties to oppose the SVT
(Daily Post, 29 Oct 1991). As the year
drew to a close, several FLP Fijians
were preparing to stand as indepen-
dents. The difference of opinion
between the FLP and the NFP, on con-
testing the election, ended the coalition
arrangement between them.
The fluctuating fortunes of Sitiveni
Rabuka frequently made the headlines
in 199I. The news that shook Fiji in
June 1991 was Rabuka's stinging criti-
cism of the interim government, which,
the general said, had lost touch with
the people, "got it all wrong," and
ought to resign. "This government is a
reactionary government," Rabuka said,
"made up of overpaid people who sit
on their laurels and wait for something
to happen before they react" (FT, 5June
1991). He even threatened to "repossess
power" he had invested in the presi-
dent. Two days later, however,
Rabuka backed down when Ganilau,
who is also Rabuka's paramount chief,
said he was "extremely disappointed,
dismayed and shocked" by the general's
utterances and demanded an uncondi-
tional apology from him; this was
offered to both Ganilau and Mara and
his cabinet colleagues. According to
confidential sources within the interim
government, Rabuka had planned to
sack the government and replace it
with a "national front" administration,
but the move failed when senior offi-
cers of the army balked. Doing an
incredible about-turn a month later,
Rabuka accepted Mara's invitation to
join the cabinet as co-deputy prime
minister and minister for home affairs
(which oversees the army, police, and
security forces). Mara had outma-
neuvered the erratic general, or so it
seemed for a while.
While in the administration, how-
ever, Rabuka continued to be an irri-
tant to his cabinet colleagues. He made
no secret of his desire to become prime
minister "to fulfil my objectives and my
promises of 1987" (PIM, Aug 1991). Pro-
jecting himself as a populist consensus
maker, Rabuka helped to resolve the
sugar dispute. He angered many chiefs
by insisting, as the Coalition had done
in 1987, that they should not mix their
traditional political roles. His distinc-
tion between "meritorious" chiefs and
"traditional" chiefs displeased many,
especially his remark that the domi-
nance of Fijian chiefs would end soon
with "replacement of traditional aris-
tocracy with meritocracy" (FT, 29 Aug
1991). In November, Rabuka was
elected to the presidency of the SVT,
providing Mara with the opportunity
to force his resignation from Cabinet.
39° THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC. FALL 1992
Rabuka insists that he considers him-
self the front-runner for prime minis-
ter, but most people in Fiji think (and
hope) that the post should go to Jose-
fata Kamikamica, the clean technocrat
widely credited with improving the
performance of the Fijian economy.
Rabuka's changing fortune is not
difficult to explain. His professed lack
of interest in politics, as expressed in
1987, has been overtaken by his ambi-
tion to become prime minister or at
least playa prominent role in national
politics for about fifteen years. This
explains why he embraced populist
positions to widen his appeal and
power base. But such activities dis-
pleased others, like Mara, who had
hoped that after executing the coups,
Rabuka would disappear from center
stage and leave the chiefs of the old
Alliance party to run the government.
Rabuka refused, seeing himself, again
like Mara, as being indispensable to
the destiny of his people. Tension
between the two men, who are alike in
both their autocratic temperament and
their highly developed sense of per-
sonal mana, will continue to make
waves in Fijian politics.
On the economic front, the interim
regime continued its multipronged
effort to resuscitate the economy
severely battered by the coups and in
1991 growing at the sluggish rate of 1.5
percent instead of the projected 3-4 per-
cent (SSD, 25 Oct 1991). It continued to
court investment from Asian countries
to break the monopoly of Australia
and New Zealand. Pakistan's Habib
Bank opened in March 1991, and a
Korean company bought 1200 hectares
of fee simple land in Vanua Levu to
establish a pineapple farming and can-
ning factory, hoping to produce IS mil-
lion pineapples for export in 1994.
Malaysia's Borneo Finance Group
began a joint venture with the govern-
ment-owned National Bank of Fiji in
April. In July, the Fiji National Petro-
leum Company (Finpeco) gave Malay-
sia the sole right to distribute petro-
leum products in Fiji, even though
independent assessments show this last
move especially to be expensive.
At the same time, the regime contin-
ued its program of deregulating the
economy. The tax-free-zone scheme,
which gives significant tax and other
concessions to companies that export
90 percent of their produce, continued.
In July, 313 companies representing an
investment of $102 million, operated in
Fiji under the scheme, while another
114 proposals were approved (PR, 21
Aug 1991). Plans were also approved to
extend the tax-free base beyond the
garment industry to include timber
processing and light manufacture of
technical equipment. There is no doubt
that the scheme has been a significant
shot in the ailing economy's arm, pro-
viding employment and improving the
balance of payments. Yet, independent
research confirms increasing poverty
among lower-income families in Fiji
(Barr, 1990).
In related economic changes, the
interim regime proposed to introduce a
10 percent value-added tax on all
major goods and services, a move its
critics say will increase the cost of most
major items by 6 to 8 percent and
which the government says will reduce
the marginal tax rate from 40 percent
to 35 percent and abolish the basic tax.
The value-added tax will come into
effect in 1992.
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The interim administration tended
to see all industrial problems as being
caused by a hostile trade union move-
ment bent on embarrassing it at every
opportunity. As a result in May at the
national economic summit held in
Suva, the regime proposed (and later
enacted) a number of far-reaching con-
trols on the operation of trade unions
in the country. The changes include the
removal of immunity from prosecution
of trade unions in cases of damages
arising from "unlawful" trade disputes;
the introduction of company-based
unions; the prohibition of industrial
associations from acting as trade
unions; the use of postal or workplace
ballots for election of union officials
(as opposed to election at annual meet-
ings); the amendment of the Trade Dis-
putes Act to widen the definition of a
strike to include other forms of indus-
trial action such as go-slow, work-to-
rule, and withdrawal of goodwill; and
the abolition of wage councils because
"getting more people into jobs is con-
sidered a better way of addressing low
household income than imposing an
arbitrary minimum wage which denies
many people access to income" (FT, 3
Nov 1991). The Fiji Trades Union Con-
gress claimed that these policies
"appear to be fuelled by a savage intent
to constrain and ultimately destroy
trade unions," (FT, 5 Nov 1991) and has
vowed to enlist international support,
including overseas shipping and airline
bans, to have them repealed. As 1991
drew to a close, the stage was set for a
bitter confrontation between the trade
unions and the interim regime.
Finally, disputes in the sugar indus-
try also dominated the news in Fiji,
bringing the country to the brink of a
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strike in May. The main issue in the
dispute was the farmers' demand for
the payment in full of the forecast price
of F$43. 70 per tonne of sugar. The Fiji
Sugar Corporation proposed to pay
only F$34.96 per tonne, on the grounds
of declining world price for sugar, bad
weather, mill breakdowns, and harvest
delays (IBP, May 1991). After much
pressure, the corporation agreed to pay
F$6 more as part of the third and final
payment. When the farmers refused to
accept this offer and demanded prompt
elections for the Sugar Cane Growers
Council, through which they could air
their grievances, the president pro-
mulgated decrees providing for four-
teen-year jail sentences and fines up to
F$IO,OOO for anyone who refused to
plant, grow, or harvest their crops, or
in any way impaired the running of the
sugar industry. When the farmers still
refused, the president threatened to use
the army to harvest cane, a prospect
strongly condemned by Rabuka. In the
end, however, the farmers' pressure
paid off. The president, with the help
of General Rabuka, revoked the
decrees, and the farmers lifted their
boycott and agreed to participate in an
all-industry conference.
Subsequently, the farmers accused
the interim regime of reneging on its
promises and delaying elections to the
Growers Council, and organized a
three-day no-harvest strike in Novem-
ber. The tensions remain. The farmers'
anxiety was not relieved by the recom-
mendations of a World Bank report
that included a steep increase in lease
rentals to bring them into line with
world market prices. The recommen-
dations are sure to become a sensitive
issue in the 1992 general elections.
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In sum, 1991 was a year of declared
intentions, pyrrhic victories, and hard-
ening positions on both sides of the
political divide in Fiji, sowing seeds of
issues and concerns that will come to
life in 1992. To paraphrase the words
of Herman Melville, 1991 was like a
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NEW CALEDONIA
In the context of the continuing imple-
mentation of policies arising from the
Matignon Accord, 1991 represents a
year of transition between the creation
of the new institutions-particularly
the provincial system-and the politi-
cal reassessment to be accomplished in
1992 by the independentists prior to the
negotiation of development contracts
for 1993-1997.
The concept of economic redistribu-
tion for the territory, which at first had
mostly involved the adoption of the
provincial system, gradually evolved
toward new concepts as the gap that
existed between the large infrastructure
projects proposed by the provincial
governments and the actual expecta-
tions and needs of local communities
became apparent. Increasingly, deci-
sions regarding development were
being taken at the level of municipal
governments. A discrepancy exists
between the need of many municipali-
ties in the back country and the islands
for public facilities and their financial
resources. Recognition of this discrep-
ancy led to a proposal to the territorial
congress to establish for 1992 an Inter-
municipal Readjustment Fund (Fonds
Intercommunal de Perequation) to
finance these public facilities. The
municipality of Noumea would not
be a part of this system, and would
instead operate under a State-City
contract.
Alain Christnacht, the new high
commissioner and central government
delegate for New Caledonia, assumed
his post in January 1991. He had served
as secretary general for the territory
from 1980 to 1982, and had been head
of Cabinet for the minister for Over-
seas Territories since July 1988.
In April, the RPCR (Rassembfement
pour fa Cafedonie dans fa Repubfique,
the loyalist party) held its first conven-
tion since that of July 1988, immedi-
ately after the signing of the Matignon
Accord. Jacques Lafleur, reelected
RPCR president, described how he
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expected the situation to develop after
1998. Convinced that the independen-
tists would fail to reach a solution
through the 1998 referendum, he pro-
posed a solution by consensus, to be
defined according to the ratios between
the various factions that emerge from
the territorial elections of 1995.
This proposal was approved by the
president of Union Caledonienne (uc),
the majority component of the FLNKS
(Front de Liberation Nationale Kanak
et Socialiste, the umbrella organization
grouping various independentist fac-
tions). uc President Frans;ois Burck
concluded that the concept of a Kanak
and socialist independence had
evolved, and that independence for
New Caledonia should no longer be
thought of as a breakaway from
France, but as an interdependence.
Burck considers that the makeup of the
consensus mentioned earlier has yet to
be defined, and that it should be the
subject of debate before the elections of
1995. In an interview in the Paris daily
Liberation, Leopold ]oredie, president
of the North Province chapter of the
UC, raised the idea of creating asso-
ciated federated states that would
assume, progressively, a part of the
responsibilities of the French central
government in matters of immigration,
mining, and foreign trade.
Uc's grass-roots membership, for
whom the 1998 referendum can still be
summed up as a choice between France
and independence, has yet to express
its opinion on these proposals by its
political leaders. The PALIKA party
(Parti de Liberation Kanak, one of the
minority factions within the FLNKS, to
which belongs Paul Neaoutyine, cur-
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rent FLNKS president) has voiced strong
opposition to these proposals, arguing
that they would lead to a breakup of
the territory. He has requested of
North Province President Leopold
]oredie that he resign from office on
account of the incompatibility between
his statements and the policies of the
FLNKS.
The dispute that for months put the
mayor of Lifou (also first vice president
of the Loyalty Islands Province) in
opposition to the island's traditional
chiefs is typical of the problems that
are cropping up with increasing fre-
quency as new development projects
affect Melanesian landownership
structures. Whereas land disputes used
to occur mostly between Melanesians
and Europeans, a recent increase in the
number of such disputes and litigations
between Melanesians is noticeable.
This increase is most likely due to the
new financial dimension given to land
by development projects. The need to
define for the future the respective roles
of the traditional chiefs and the politi-
cal leaders has been the subject of
numerous debates within the various
independentist factions during the
year.
Generally, the social climate has
been less tense than in 1990, despite a
number of strikes, many of which were
prolonged because of the rivalry
between the two major labor unions,
the Union Syndicale des Travailleurs
Kanak et Exploites (Union of Kanak
and Exploited Workers, USTKE) and
the Union Syndicale des Ouvriers et
Employes de Nouvelle-Caledonie
(Union of New Caledonian Workers
and Employees, USOENC).
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The slowdown in economic activity
that was observed in 1990 continued
through 1991, in spite of a recovery in
the production and exportation of
nickel ore during the first two quarters;
the production of metal remained sta-
ble. At mid-year, the tight economic
situation was still affecting industry
and trade, both wholesale and retail.
For the first nine months of 1991,
activity in the tourism sector was
slightly lower than in the previous year.
By the end of September, 60,255 visitors
had been recorded, 2.7 percent fewer
than for the same period in 1990. This
was mainly due to a marked drop in
Japanese visitors during the first
quarter.
Although inflation registered a sig-
nificant drop in 1990, it rose again in
1991. By October, the rise in retail
prices had reached 4.3 percent, against
an increase of 1.4 percent for the whole
of 1990.
On the international scene, relations
between the territory and the nations
of the Pacific region intensified. Two
ministers from Vanuatu (for Health
and for Agriculture) paid an official
visit in March. In July, the Fiji Foreign
Trade minister and the Solomon
Islands Foreign Affairs minister came
to New Caledonia on a mission for the
South Pacific Forum. In October, the
governor of American Samoa came on
an information mission, followed in
November by the deputy prime minis-
ter of New Zealand, and in December
by the prime minister of Papua New
Guinea.
Another sign of the growing integra-
tion of the territory into the political
environment of the region is the
appointment of Jacques Iekawe to the
post of secretary general of the South
Pacific Commission during the Thirty-
first South Pacific Conference in Tonga
in November. He is the first French-
speaking Melanesian and the first Cale-
donian to hold this position. Iekawe,
aged forty-five, was born on the island
of Tiga in the Loyalty group, and had
been secretary general for the territory
from 1988, until he became territorial
secretary (prefet detegue) in charge of
economic development in March 1990.
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PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Some negative trends of recent years
continued in 1991. Although growth in
the minerals sector approached boom
proportions, the rest of the economy,
on which the vast majority of the popu-
lation depends, remained sluggish. A
widening gap between expectations
and opportunities continued to aggra-
vate problems of social control and to
place resource development efforts in
jeopardy. Meanwhile, the secessionist
crisis in Bougainville, where these
problems are most starkly illustrated,
remained unresolved after three years.
The government's attempt in 1991 to
confront the formidable law-and-order
problem was the most comprehensive
to date. According to Prime Minister
Rabbie NamaIiu, crime threatened the
viability of major resource projects and
"the very future of our young country"
(TPNG, 21 March 1991). Some of his
crime-fighting measures were designed
to improve the state's ability to exercise
social control. Curfews were imposed
in Port Moresby and other cities to
restrict the movement of "rascal"
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gangs, and facilitate raids on "known
criminal areas." The defense force was
called out in support of the police, who
were provided with improved equip-
ment and a larger operating budget.
Twenty overseas police officers were
recruited to join the forty or so already
in Papua New Guinea under the Aus-
tralian-funded Police Development
Project (TPNG, 19 Sept 1991). Namaliu
also promised more legal expertise to
boost conviction rates, and maximum
security sections for prisons in Port
Moresby and Lae to reduce the number
of escapes.
The curfews brought an immediate
reduction in urban crime. However, if
past experience with paramilitary
crackdowns is anything to go by, the
lull in criminal activity will be only
temporary (Harris 1988). Ongoing
problems with police discipline were
illustrated in November when police
upset with housing allocations ram-
paged through Gordon's Barracks
(TPNG, 14 Nov 1991). Some time may
also be needed to rectify existing prob-
lems of recruitment, training, and
retention in the court system.
In addition, Namaliu promised to
fight crime through legislative action.
The death penalty was duly introduced
by Parliament as an option for violent
crimes such as murder and gang rape,
although the proposal to tattoo crimi-
nals' foreheads was not pursued. Some
measures required amendments to the
1975 constitution. Established princi-
ples of protection under the law were
modified to accommodate a section of
the 1977 Inter-Group Fighting Act that
requires accused persons to prove they
did not take part in tribal fighting. In a
more significant departure from exist-
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ing principles, Parliament amended
constitutional provisions protecting
personal liberty. The purpose was to
clear the way for the reintroduction of
the controversial Vagrancy Act, ruled
unconstitutional in 1977, as well as a
bill "to allow the repatriation of unem-
ployed people and trouble makers to
their home areas" (TPNG, 21 March
1991). If introduced, these measures
will give the state formidable powers to
restrict freedom of movement in Papua
New Guinea.
The national service scheme for
youth was the most innovative crime-
fighting measure announced by Nama-
liu in March (Boyce 1991). Minister for
Forests Karl Stack was put in charge of
the new Ministry of the Interior, and a
task force established to develop the
concept further. At first the proposed
scheme involved the recruitment of
some six hundred ex-Gurkhas to help
establish an armed national guard.
However, most of the military aspects
had disappeared by the time the revised
proposal emerged from Cabinet in
August. In its latest form, the proposal
calls for one-year compulsory national
service for males between the ages of
sixteen and nineteen years, and volun-
tary service for eighteen- and nineteen-
year-old females. When fully estab-
lished in the mid-1990S, the renamed
National Service Corps will consist of
thirty-two hundred staff supervising
some thirty thousand youth at two
hundred training posts throughout the
country. The scheme will be launched
on a trial basis in 1992, with pilot pro-
jects in each province providing train-
ing to young male volunteers.
The authors of a major law-and-
order report pointed out in 1984 that
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similar schemes in other parts of the
Third World have generally been un-
successful, shortlived, and very expen-
sive to administer (Clifford, Morauta,
and Stuart 1984, 125-126). If imple-
mented as planned, Stack's scheme will
cost at least 70 million kina a year, a
significant proportioQ of the national
budget. Moreover, youth mobilization
and training on this scale may prove
problematic in Papua New Guinea
where modern-sector employment
prospects are extremely poor.
In 1988 the World Bank (1988 , 34)
predicted that only 15 percent of the
estimated forty-four thousand new
entrants to the workforce each year
would find formal-sector employment.
On the assumption that there was a
causal relationship between unemploy-
ment and crime, the government began
work in 1991 on strategies to reduce
unemployment. Early in the year, it
announced new measures designed to
revive commodity production in the
stagnant agricultural sector of the
economy (TPNG, 7 Mar 1991). Some
aimed to reduce the cost of agricultural
inputs, while others promised improve-
ments in extension services, research,
and training. However, in the absence
of a dramatic increase in export prices,
which remain very depressed, the pros-
pects for growth in this sector are poor.
In September 1991, a major new ini-
tiative to stimulate growth in the non-
mining sector of the economy was
unveiled by Minister for Trade and
Industry John Giheno (TPNG, 5 Sept
1991). The central focus of the Medium
Term Industry and Trade Development
Action Plan was industrial develop-
ment through resource-based down-
stream processing. Most of the pro-
posed new manufactured products
would be for export, although some
would replace imports on the domestic
market. In addition, the possibility of
developing "basic industries such as
cement, steel fabrication, ships and
boat building" was to be pursued. The
general idea was to attract investors to
selected industrial sites where utility
charges, rents, wages, and other costs
are controlled or subsidized. Most of
the basic industries, and some aimed at
import substitution, would presumably
be established with the help of protec-
tive tariffs.
Announcing an earlier scheme to
increase the labor content of govern-
ment-funded construction work, the
prime minister vowed that "any resist-
ance to this change or any undermining
of our policies will be crushed" (TPNG,
28 Mar 1991). Nevertheless, crucial
parts of the plan are likely to encounter
considerable resistance, not only from
an unwieldy bureaucracy, but from the
increasingly influential World Bank. In
a survey produced in conjunction with
the fourth annual meeting of Papua
New Guinea's major aid donors, the
bank urged, among other things, "out-
ward oriented" trade policies and an
end to import protection (TPNG, 13
June 1991). At its Singapore meeting
in May, the Consultative Group for
Papua New Guinea authorized an aid
package worth U5$560 million.
The minerals sector continued to
expand despite some setbacks. Con-
struction of stage two of the giant gold
mine at Porgera, and its natural gas-
fired power plant, was completed dur-
ing the year, boosting production to
841,000 ounces for the first nine
months of 1991 (TPNG, 24 Oct 1991).
HAl
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Even more significant, work com-
menced on the Kutubu oil project,
which is expected to start producing
128,000 barrels a day in August 1992.
Landowner protests continued to
plague Papua New Guinea's major
resource projects during 1991. There
were several upheavals at the Kutubu
project, and in November the premier
of the Southern Highlands province
threatened to shut the project down
unless more local benefits materialized
(TPNG, 21 Nov 1991). Dissatisfied land-
owners forced work to stop at the Lihir
gold project in July, and by September
there were reports that the mine would
not go ahead unless the investment cli-
mate improved (TPNG, 4 July, 12 Sept
1991). The most serious incident came
in March when a group of armed men
led by a local politician closed down
the Mount Kare gold mining project to
press demands for a new road (TPNG,
21 Mar 1991).
Early in the year the national gov-
ernment expressed interest in US busi-
nessman Jay Pritzker's offer to take
over moribund Bougainville Copper
Limited (TPNG, 28 Feb, 4 Apr 1991).
But these plans seemed premature as
several attempts to settle the Bougain-
ville crisis floundered during 1991.
Indeed, neither the national govern-
ment nor the secessionists appeared
capable of developing a unified and
coherent approach to the problem.
Most consistent in its approach was
the Papua New Guinea Defence Force,
which had reestablished control of the
northern island of Buka in 1990. The
overall military strategy was to secure
zones of influence in the north and
south of Bougainville, thereby isolating
the rebel strongholds in the central part
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of the island. By the end of 1991, the
army was ensconced at several coastal
locations in the north. The most ambi-
tious military operation came in April,
when troops landed from a patrol boat
north of Arawa, blew up the Arakabal
bridge near Manetai, and then drove
for six hours to the safety of the north-
ern tip of the island (TPNG, 18 April
1991).
This military adventure was not for-
mally authorized by Cabinet, although
some government ministers apparently
had prior knowledge of it (TPNG, 2
May 1991). Some prominent "doves" in
the coalition government, including
Bernard Narokobi and Father John
Momis, complained bitterly that they
had not been consulted. Their bitter-
ness was understandable, because the
action appeared to deal the final blow
to the Honiara Declaration on Peace,
Reconciliation and Rehabilitation on
Bougainville that Momis, Narokobi,
and Foreign Minister Somare had
negotiated in January.
Like its predecessor, the 1990
Endeavour Accord, the Honiara Decla-
ration deferred the critical issue of
future political status until after peace
could be achieved, government services
restored, and a rehabilitation program
launched (TPNG, 24 Jan 1991). The
most significant new provision was for
the involvement of a multinational
supervisory team. However, by the end
of the year this team, which the Lon-
don-based Commonwealth Secretariat
offered to coordinate, had not been
assembled. Government services had
been restored only in those parts of the
province controlled by government
forces, and even emergency medical
supplies remained scarce elsewhere.
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The opposition of the military
undoubtedly contributed to the down-
fall of the Honiara Declaration. In
July, Father Momis charged that the
military had interfered with his efforts
to restore services (TPNG, 18 July 1991),
and in October International Red
Cross officials reported that troops in
Rabaul and Buka had been deliberately
blocking their shipments of essential
medicines for several months (Age, 15
Oct 1991). Furthermore, the Namaliu
government appeared unwilling or
unable to overcome this opposition.
Colonel Leo Nuia, the architect of the
April foray into Bougainville, received
no more than a reprimand. He was
finally dismissed in June-but only
after he publicly confirmed that Aus-
tralian-donated helicopters had earlier
been used as gunships and to dump
bodies of rebel suspects at sea (Snow
1991).
Problems of disunity were equally
apparent on the Bougainville side of
the dispute. The most influential men
in Bougainville in 1991 continued to be
the self-styled president of the republic,
Francis Ona, and members of his
Supreme Advisory Council. The
Interim Government, consisting mainly
of politicians and church leaders,
appeared to have only limited power.
This was publicly demonstrated
shortly after Interim Government
Chairman Joseph Kabui signed the
Honiara Declaration on behalf of the
Bougainville secessionists. When the
first shipment of relief supplies reached
Kieta in February, Bougainville Revo-
lutionary Army Commander Samuel
Kauona told reporters that Kabui had
acted without authorization and that
the agreement meant nothing (TPNG,
28 Feb 1991).
In October, leaders from the south-
ern part of the island signed an agree-
ment with the national government to
establish an Interim Constituent
Assembly (TPNG, 24 Oct 1991). At
year's end, national government offi-
cials appeared confident that Bougain-
ville would soon return to normal as
more of these interim authorities
appeared. In November, however,
rebels attacked an army camp near
Tinputz. Ona claimed that the raid,
which left fifteen of his men dead,
showed the determination of the peo-
ple of Bougainville to resist any reinva-
sion attempts. He promised that the
Bougainville Revolutionary Army
would "fight to the last man" (TPNG, 7
Nov 1991).
The opposition fell into disarray in
1991, and the Namaliu government had
little difficulty getting some major
pieces of legislation through Parlia-
ment. In addition to the law-and-order
provisions already mentioned, Parlia-
ment finally adopted a constitutional
amendment that prohibits parliamen-
tary motions of no confidence for the
first eighteen months of a prime minis-
ter's term in office (TPNG, 25 July 1991).
This should have a profound effect on
national politics in Papua New Guinea,
where such votes have been frequent
and disruptive.
The government encountered con-
siderable opposition from university
students when politicians voted them-
selves a pay raise in May. Claiming to
act on behalf of "the silent majority
who do not have the access and the
intelligence to know what is going on,"
, , \ . ~,;\.' f,.
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the students burned government vehi-
cles and boycotted classes (TPNG, 3
May 1991). Prime Minister Namaliu
quickly promised that Parliament
would reverse the decision when it
reconvened in July, but the students
demanded an immediate special session
of Parliament and continued their boy-
cott (TPNG, 6 June 1991). The standoff
ended in June with the suspension of
the Student Representative Council,
the arrest of three student leaders, and
the arrival of armed police on the
Waigani campus of the University of
Papua New Guinea (TPNG, 20 June
1991). By then it was too late to make
proper arrangements for the second
term, and the students were sent home
for the rest of the year (TPNG, 4 July
1991).
In September, Deputy Prime Minis-
ter Ted Diro, the most prominent of
the many individuals implicated in the
1987 forest industry inquiry, was
finally dismissed from Parliament after
a leadership tribunal found him guilty
of eighty-one charges of misconduct in
office. Diro did succeed in having Mr
Justice Amet removed from the first
leadership tribunal formed to hear his
case. Apparently acting on information
received from Mrs Leila Barnett, the
estranged wife of the author of the for-
est industry report, Diro argued that he
would not receive a fair hearing from
Amet because he was a close friend of
Barnett (TPNG, 8 Aug 1991). However,
he appeared only once before a new tri-
bunal headed by Mr Justice Ellis, refus-
ing to participate further after the
Barnett reports were admitted as evi-
dence (TPNG, 12 Sept 1991).
The most dramatic moments came
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in early October after the tribunal rec-
ommended that Diro be fined 3,300
kina and dismissed from public office
for three years. These recommenda-
tions were duly transmitted to the gov-
ernor-general who has an unambigu-
ous constitutional obligation to act
accordingly. However, SirSerei Eri, a
fellow Papuan, refused to sign the dis-
missal, claiming that it would result in
political instability. Cabinet had no
option but to seek Sir Serei's own dis-
missal, especially after hearing evi-
dence that he had attempted to inter-
fere in the work of the tribunal on two
earlier occasions. The government sub-
sequently accepted Sir Serei's resigna-
tion, which he tendered shortly before
the request for dismissal reached Her
Majesty the Queen in London (TPNG, 3
Oct, 10 Oct 1991). He was replaced by
Southern Highlands Member of Parlia-
ment Wiwa Korowi.
It was not a good year for Papua
New Guinea's foreign relations. Accu-
sations of human rights abuses on
Bougainville continued, fueled by the
televised statements of Colonel Leo
Nuia and the deliberate blocking of
medical supplies to the island. The
accusations came mainly from church
and community groups in Australia,
but reached a wider audience in August
when secessionist leaders presented
their case to a United Nations human
rights subcommission in Geneva. Gov-
ernment officials responded by attack-
ing foreign journalists for conveying
negative images of Papua New Guinea,
and the Australian government for
issuing visas to Bougainvillean leaders
traveling overseas. Relations with Aus-
tralia were strained further in Septem-
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SOLOMON ISLANDS
Prime Minister Solomon Mamaloni, a
leader used to the rough and tumble of
island politics, warned the country in
his 1990 Christmas message that 1991
would not be an easy year (55, II Jan
1991). This proved to be the case, and
the government's travails came from
both within and outside the country.
Among the many issues of 1991, two
stand out-the state of the economy
and diplomatic relations, especially
relating to the Papua New Guinea-
Bougainville debacle.
The central focus of the government
was on improving the economy. In his
March budget speech, Minister of
Finance and Economic Planning
Columbus Abe defined the country's
major economic problems as a widen-
ing government deficit, poor terms of
trade, and a failure to be competitive.
The government's strategies to remedy
these problems include commercializa-
tion and privatization of government
holdings and services, upgrading gov-
ernment financial management capabi-
lities, and restructuring the public ser-
vICe.
Early in the year, the prime minister
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ber when a new joint agreement on
security cooperation fell far short of
official expectations in Port Moresby
(TPNG, 12 Sept 1991).
Relations with Solomon Islands
were also at a low ebb in 1991, as
Papua New Guinea urged a reluctant
Honiara to do more in the fight against
the Bougainville secessionists. The big-
gest humiliation of the year, however,
came in September when Foreign Min-
ister Sir Michael Somare lost a bid for
the presidency of the United Nations
General Assembly, which officials had
earlier claimed was all but in the bag
(TPNG, 19 Sept 1991).
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emphasized the need for a major
restructuring of the public service.
Sixty percent of the national budget
goes toward paying salaries, but as the
prime minister correctly observed, "a
lot of the job descriptions are duplica-
tions of the same jobs" (55,2 Jan 1991).
The basic aims of restructuring the
public service are to have a slimmer,
fitter public service, and to distribute
technical people, such as planners, to
parts of the country where they are
most needed. By November, two hun-
dred of the six hundred public servants
had received letters of dismissal from
the public service (55, 29 Nov 1991).
Keen to keep government expendi-
ture under control, Abe formed a com-
mittee, known as the Junta, to screen
government expenditures (55, 29 Jan
1991). All accounting officers were
required to lodge their 1991 expendi-
ture plans with the Junta.
With regard to development pro-
jects, the government continued its pol-
icy of restructuring by privatization, or
opted for joint ventures if privatization
was impossible. Since 1992 was to be
declared the year of tourism, the gov-
ernment wished to achieve as much as
possible in that area also. The Japanese
government and the European Com-
munity showed interest in extending
Henderson Airport terminal, improv-
ing the runway, and upgrading the nav-
igation lights. All this would cost
around SI$53.9 million (55, 30 Aug
1991). Early in March, Solomon Island
Airways (SOLAIR) opened a new route
to Cairns, which General Manager
Robert Leong declared "the gateway to
Australia and the Pacific for us" (55, 8
Mar 1991).
The dispute over the reopening of
4°1
the Anuha resort became an intractable
problem for both the government and
landowners. Early in the year, Austra-
lian investor Mike Gore dismissed alle-
gations that Anuha was for sale.
Despite these assurances nothing hap-
pened, and in mid-year Minister for
Tourism and Aviation Victor Ngele
expressed doubts about Gore's serious-
ness. In August the minister issued an
ultimatum saying "if he does not reply
by 12 August, we shall consider other
means of how we could solve the
Anuha issue" (55, 2 Aug 1991). In early
November the Anuha landowners
decided to take legal action to recover
the sl$800,000 owed them (55,1 Nov
1991).
In April, the Solomon Islands Public
Employees Union, which was claiming
a 16.5 percent salary increase, went on
strike after Secretary to the Prime Min-
ister Leonard Maenu told the executive
that the government no longer recog-
nized the union. This provoked the
strike, which lasted until June when the
government finally agreed to pay the
increase and back-date it to January.
This cost the government an extra
SI$5·6 million (5N, 7 June 1991).
In July, the Solomon Islands
National Teachers' Association went
on strike, claiming a 16 percent pay
increase, salaries to be paid on a fort-
nightly basis, and future increases to be
pegged to increases for public employ-
ees. They also sought the removal of
the three officials from the prime min-
ister's office who allegedly mishandled
the public employees' strike (55, 12 July
1991).
Human resources development con-
tinued to assume great importance
because Solomon Islands still has the
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lowest level of education in the region
(Crocombe 1988, 126). The govern-
ment's aggressive approach to the issue
was underscored by the minister of
Finance in his budget speech when he
said "The provision of manpower is
essential if the Solomon Island's econ-
omy is to develop.... the government
is making a major investment in educa-
tion. Funds are provided to construct
Adaua Secondary school, upgrade the
research training facilities at SICHE,
rehabilitate Choiseul Bay secondary
school to form V level and to provide a
variety of overseas scholarships" (5N,
26 Mar 1991).
The emphasis on human resources
development became especially clear
and urgent when the University of
Papua New Guinea's Waigani campus
was closed after a student strike and
Solomon Island students were forced to
return home (55,26 July 1991). InJune,
the council of the Solomon Islands Col-
lege of Higher Education expressed the
aim to have the college converted to
university status in the future. This was
in line with the government's Pro-
gramme of Action.
On the international scene, the gov-
ernment became quite extensively
involved in the Bougainville secession
issue. Early in the year Papua New
Guinea's Minister for Decentralization
Father John Momis made a surprise
visit to Honiara. This was supposed to
be a private visit to Prime Minister
Mamaloni, but soon afterward Papua
New Guinea officials and representa-
tives of the Bougainville Revolutionary
Army met to produce the Honiara
Accord.
Matters got complicated when Solo-
mon Islander and Australian Associ-
ated Press reporter Alfred Sasako was
banned from entering Papua New
Guinea after he traveled to Bougain-
ville to interview secessionist leader
Francis Ona (55, I Mar 1991). Then in
May, former Prime Minister Ezekiel
Alebua, leaders in Western Province,
and some Solomon Islanders with rela-
tives in Bougainville sent messages of
congratulations to mark the first anni-
versary of the Republic of Bougain-
ville's unilateral declaration of inde-
pendence (55,17 May 1991). Friction
was reported in December between the
governments of Solomon Islands and
Papua New Guinea over Papua New
Guinea's request that two Bougainvil-
leans in Honiara be deported to Port
Moresby (55, 6 Dec 1991).
There were major changes in the
provinces. Choiseul achieved auton-
omy from the Western Province on 12
September. Speaking during the cere-
mony to mark the birth of the new
province, Alfred Maetia emphasized
that "the achievement of this political
milestone for Choiseul is owed to the
determination of the leaders and the
people of Choiseul. . . . it must be
borne in mind that the determination
has come to fruition only through the
democratic principles embedded in our
constitution" (5N, 8 Nov 1991).
Fundamental constitutional changes
were achieved on 2 August. The chair
of the Special Select Committee for the
Patriation of the Constitution, Francis
Saemala, presented the committee's
report to the prime minister. It recom-
mended that the constitution, which is
a schedule to the 1978 Independence
Order (an act of the British Parlia-
ment), be established as a separate
instrument, the creation of parliamen-
.,t~,. I 1 j .. ~, .
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tary standing committees, the rotation
of the governor-general among the
provinces, improving parliamentary
standing orders, and identifying areas
of the constitution needing immediate
amendments (5N, 20 July 1991).
Leadership, especially political lead-
ership, continued to bean issue. Sir
Peter Kenilorea left politics after fifteen
years of service to become director of
the Forum Fisheries Agency. On 17
October, Andrew Nori resigned as
leader of the opposition because he
lacked the necessary support. He was
succeeded by Joses Tuhanuku (5N, 8
Nov 1991). Reputations of a number of
leaders were under scrutiny. The Lead-
ership Code Commission finally
cleared the names of Alex Barlett, Col-
ombus Abe, and the prime minister
over the 1990 51$250 million loan pro-
posal, ruling that their action did not
contravene section 94(1)(b)(c)(d) of the
constitution.
Among the political parties, the Peo-
ples' Alliance Party appeared active
and organized. Early in the year, Act-
ing General Secretary David Kausimae
called for party members who were
ministers in the Mamaloni government
to show their real allegiance to the
party (55, IS Feb 1991). During the
annual general meeting in November,
new officers were elected and issued an
ultimatum to the ministers to make the
choice to resign from the Government
of National Unity or face being sacked
by the party (55, IS Nov 1991).
Overall, 1991 proved quite eventful.
For the Mamaloni government, more
determination and decisiveness are
needed to implement the party's poli-
cies in the remainder of its parliamen-
tary term. Even for a "founding father"
'1.
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VANUATU
For Vanuatu, 1991 was the year of the
three prime ministers. In August-Sep-
tember Father Walter Lini was finally
replaced as Vanua'aku Pati (vp) leader
and prime minister by Donald Kalpo-
kas. And in the national elections in
December, the vp-which had ruled
Vanuatu since independence in 1980-
lost office to a coalition led by Maxim
Carlot and dominated by his (fran-
cophone) Union of Moderate
Parties (UMP).
Dissatisfaction with Lini's leader-
ship had mounted in February when he
sacked Finance Minister Sela Molisa,
apparently over "personality differ-
ences" (PR, 14 Feb 1991, I). The dis-
missal followed a major Cabinet
reshuffle in November 1990, in which
Lini had assumed several key portfo-
lios. The previous October, Lini had
sacked Grace Molisa, a senior political
adviser and the wife of Sela Molisa.
She had been Lini's private secretary
for several years, but they fell out when
, n~,<,. '~'''.,,.J'
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she denounced his expulsion of five
expatriate businessmen (PR, 31 Oct
1991,3). Deportation orders ("green
letters") have been controversial in
Vanuatu, because at times they have
been used to remove business rivals
and settle political and personal scores,
especially against French expatriates
(see PIM, July 1991, 20-21).
Lini's critics claimed he had become
dependent on two advisers-a local
Vietnamese businessman, Dinh van
Tanh, and a wealthy American, Jack
Scantlin-while losing touch with for-
mer VP associates (IBP, Oct 1991, 21-
22; PIM, July 1991, 18, 21). Despite
leadership tensions, VP officials drew
comfort from the partial local elections
held in late January, in which the VP
performed reasonably well (PR, 14 Feb
1991,3; VW, 2 Feb 1991, I, II).
In late March the new terminal,
funded by Japan, was opened at Bauer-
field, the international airport. This
followed the extension of the runway,
funded by Australia, completed earlier
in the year. At the opening ceremony,
Lini thanked these two countries and
also the United Kingdom, the Euro-
pean Economic Community, and New
Zealand for their contributions toward
the improvement of Vanuatu's tourism
and air transport facilities (VW, 28 Mar
1991, I, II).
Criticism of Lini increased further in
mid-April after he sacked three senior
public servants. In an attempt to
resolve the leadership question, the VP
brought its annual congress, planned
for June, forward to late April. After
heated discussions at the congress,
Lini's supporters managed to defer the
vote on the membership of the national
executive (PR, 2 May 1991, I).
Lini's troubles worsened in May. He
had a mild heart attack, compounding
the poor health he has experienced
since suffering a stroke in early 1987.
He could not fulfill the heavy workload
he had assumed. In many areas govern-
ment and administration ground to a
halt (PR, 16 May 1991,2). In late 1990,
Lini had expressed willingness to stand
down at some future date, but now he
refused to give up power, and in June
and July sacked four more ministers as
well as several public servants. In late
July, leaders of the Presbyterian church
denounced his arbitrary actions and
the "increased nepotism" in his admin-
istration (PR, 25 July 1991, I). Lini's
position had become untenable: the
Presbyterian church is adhered to by
some 40 percent of the population and
traditionally has formed the VP's sup-
port base, along with the Anglican
church, in which Lini is a priest (see
Henningham 1989,173).
The crunch came at a special VP
congress held on 7 August. The meet-
ing, which Lini and his supporters boy-
cotted, chose Donald Kalpokas to
replace Lini as party president. Under
the VP constitution the party president
also serves as prime minister when the
party is in power, so Kalpokas was set
to become prime minister, bringing
Lini's eleven-year term to an end. But
Lini defied the congress decision, cling-
ing to power until ousted in a parlia-
mentary vote of no-confidence on 6
September. Before leaving office Lini
announced, on 17 August, the release
of Jimmy Stephens, imprisoned in 1980
for leading the abortive secession
attempt on Espiritu Santo. Stephens,
now seventy-six, in poor health, and
nearing the end of his sentence, had
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agreed to engage in a ceremony of cus-
tomary reconciliation with Lini follow-
ing his release (vw, 24 Aug 1991, I, 6-
7; IBP, Oct 1991, 24)·
The new prime minister announced
that national elections would be held
soon and said that his administration
would restore business confidence (PR,
19 Sept 1991, 2). In October, he rein-
stated Grace Molisa as private secre-
tary to the prime minister. Meanwhile
investigations into the conduct of Lini
began.
Kalpokas' term as prime minister
was brief: his government lost power at
the elections on 2December. The polls
went ahead peacefully, with only
minor irregularities. The UMP won 30.6
percent of the vote and 19 seats. Next
came the VP, with 22.6 percent of the
vote and 10 seats, and Lini's newly
formed National United Party (NUP),
with 20.4 percent and 10 seats. Barak
Sope's Melanesian Progressive Party
(MPP), formed after the Lini-Sope split
in 1988, won 15-4 percent of the vote
and 4 seats, with most of the remaining
votes and I seat each going to the Tan
Union, Nagriamel, and Fren Melanesia
(Van Trease, 1991, II-I2; VW, 14 Dec
1991,10-15).
The UMP had performed less con-
vincingly than in the 1987 elections,
when it gained 39.9 percent of the vote,
and only slightly better than in 1983,
when its share was 28.6 percent. In
1991 the main difference was that the
former VP had split into three parties.
Indeed at 58.4 percent, the combined
percentage performance in 1991 of the
VP, the NUP, and the MPP was almost as
high as the 60.5 percent attained by the
former VP in 1979 and higher than its
scores of 55 percent in 1983 and 47.3
":1 •
percent in 1987. Regional differences
were apparent in the voting patterns.
The VP won most of its seats in the cen-
tral and southern islands, whereas the
NUP won most of its seats in the north-
ern islands.
The UMP first sought to establish a
governing coalition with the MPP and
then with the VP. But both parties
asked too high a price. So the UMP
fashioned a coalition with Lini's NUP
and with the small Fren Melanesia
party to obtain a 30-seat majority. On
16 December, at the first sitting of the
new parliament, Maxim Carlot, the
UMP'S secretary general, became the
new prime minister. While conceding
that the deal with Lini's party had
caused dissension within the UMP,
Carlot argued that the coalition
arrangement would permit stable gov-
enment (Age, 26 Dec 1991,13). Carlot
named an eleven-member cabinet com-
prising himself and six other UMP mem-
bers and four NUP members. The NUP
members included Hilda Lini, a promi-
nent journalist and politician and a sis-
ter of Walter Lini, who thus became
Vanuatu's first woman minister. Lini
himself remained on the back bench,
though it was rumored that in due
course he would succeed Fred Tima-
kata as president of Vanuatu.
In an address to the nation, Prime
Minister Carlot said his government
would reestablish political stability,
reconcile differences, encourage invest-
ment, and promote economic develop-
ment (VW, 21 Dec 1991,7-8, II). He
promised to promote bilingualism,
ending the disadvantages of Fran-
cophones under VP rule. He also
denounced nepotism and business
favoritism. He and his supporters indi-
• ,~::.,' f~, \i
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cated that inquiries into alleged malad-
ministration and corruption by the Lini
government and its associates may be
pursued. Although keen to strengthen
connections with France, Carlot said
he wanted Vanuatu to maintain close
links with Australia, New Zealand, the
United Kingdom, and the Pacific Island
countries.
Carlot's government faces big chal-
lenges. He and his ministers lack expe-
rience. The UMP-NUP alliance is fragile:
the UMP is a loose, factionalized coali-
tion, and there are both bad blood and
policy divergences-notably over for-
eign policy and land issues-between it
and the NUP. The political uncertain-
ties of 1991 worsened economic and
developmental problems. The new
administration will need to contain
anglophone-francophone and regional
rivalries and to provide stable and
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